Well, let’s start with, I would say, how many years has it been that people have said, oh, the credit problems are coming, the credit problems are coming, we just don’t know in direct lending, these sort of very amorphous and I’m not saying you’re saying this, but these kind of amorphous, spooky-sounding questions, which I think, we can guess sometimes who the people are that advocate that story. Let’s just start with a few facts. The fact of the matter is we haven’t seen any uptick in defaults, any uptick in losses. In point of fact, we’re still running at a 6-basis-point annualized loss rate since inception, all of which has been offset by realized gains and a bit more than that. Now, I appreciate and agree it’s been a generally benign environment economically, but, I mean, we did have a pandemic. We have had a war in Ukraine. We have had rates rise dramatically and we’ve had many peers experience a lot more credit problems than we have. I’m not saying that with complacency or arrogance or anything like it, but at the end of the day, there are differences in the way we operate, the credits we pick, how we pick them. You noted the most important part from our point of view, which is loan-to-value. Having lots of cushions, both in percentage and absolute terms. Remember, when we’re lucky enough to partner with Thoma Bravo and lead a financing for, say, Anaplan, not only is it a 70% equity check, it’s a $7 billion equity check. Both of those matter in this calculus, percentage and scale, and that’s why we focus where we do. So, with regard to default rates, let me just observe that the signs that will presage, that will come ahead of a meaningful change in default rates, those are not in any manner flashing yellow yet. That’s not to suggest that there won’t be a recession at some point. In fact, as credit people, it’d be crazy for us not to contemplate and plan for that. But today, our portfolio, right now, revenue and EBITDA on average across the portfolio grew 10% quarter-over-quarter. That is pretty robust. Now, that’s partly the favorable selection of the kinds of businesses we underwrite, but pretty favorable. We aren’t seeing any meaningful change in requests for out-of-the-ordinary course amendments. We aren’t seeing any meaningful change in requests for PIC. We aren’t seeing meaningful changes in running out of liquidity. So, I say all of that to say that we don’t see any of those, not just warning signs, they sort of are checkpoints that have to happen before you get to meaningful defaults. Then you get to recoveries, to your point, which we couldn’t agree more, in some regards is the critical item, because a default in and of itself isn’t a problem. Now, we’re better off to avoid them and we can count the number of defaults we’ve had literally on things like fingers. So, keeping defaults really low remains the most important thing we can do and will do. But when we’ve taken companies, our recoveries have been extremely strong and keeping loan to value is the way to ensure that. When you’re running 40% of a purchase price in a loan, a fire sale still gets you your money back and that is really important. That’s why we like these big, durable, strategic assets. We’ve said this from inception and there’s been lots of questions along the way as we led the market toward this direction of lender of first choice going to the biggest credits, the best credits, why, lots of talk about all those, there’s more opportunities in the small market, there’s not. The opportunities to be in the big credits where you have that durability because they’re strategic assets that someone will buy, even if they stumble, even if they get in trouble. And that, to your point, which we couldn’t agree more, is all about maximizing recoveries. The last part you said was in these growthier businesses, software businesses. Actually, the reason we like those businesses is because the recoveries will actually be the highest in our view. Those businesses, if and when they have a problem, they still have enormous amounts of gross margin, right? These companies, the ones we finance and the ones that are bought have extremely high, let’s set aside even the growth rate, assume that somehow has to get tempered if we’re going to have one of these problems that you’re talking about. But these are still businesses that have hundreds of millions of dollars of customers that are really for all intents and purposes dependent on the use of a piece of software with 80% to 90% gross margins. Taking that and consolidating it with another strategic owner of a software business is exactly the kind of way out that we’re talking about. Someone wants that business. That is a valuable cash flow stream, unlike a traditional industrial business where let’s suppose you’re out in a deep cycle and nobody wants the capacity. Who wants a factory that doesn’t have any use for its capacity? That’s just not what you have in these software businesses. So, it’s exactly why we like it. It’s why, in point of fact, we have still not ever had a default in a software business, let alone a problem with a recovery.