So what was known was the first half of the deal, and you're right, that would have been accretive. The shares would have been issued at an attractive price. We would have used a modicum of cash. We would have not incurred any debt in this. That would have been an accretive transaction. Assuming that we could take down the second half of that portfolio at that same cap rate, it would have -- all the way through, it would have been accretive, right? And be mindful, it was a balancing act. It wasn't like we were -- no party was ripping either's face off, right? It was balanced. It was accretive. They would be making money. They would -- have been in the money on that trade. We would have been in the money. I think a couple of things came into play. And look, I alluded to this and I own this, is that, for accounting reasons, the JV couldn't have still spelled out exactly the second half. And so I misunderstood or I wanted to be optimistic, and I thought that the agreement we had allowed us to take down the remainder of the same cap rate. And that wasn't that perspective. And I think that -- and that's fine. And I don't think they misled us at all. I think I just -- we just had a miscommunication, and sometimes that happens because you're focused on so many things. You got term sheets going back and forth with attorneys. It wasn't evident until some of the attorney language came out, was like, wait a minute, this isn't about -- the mechanics that they were suggesting wasn't the one we thought of. And so could I close over it? I mean, God, there's been so many probably CEOs out there who have been in that same -- I have to think about Jeff Witherell at Plymouth, right? He got done with the Madison stuff, cleaned up his balance sheet and then he comes and does another deal with Sixth Street. And probably when he started that process, he probably thought, this looks good, this is going to be a good deal, this is going to help us grow and he did everything with good intent and probably what happened is it got down to the 11th hour and you get sort of you get so far down the road, some people -- there's just some cost balancing, right? And they're like, oh, well, I got to close over it. And he did. And he was doing it at 23, and I think he's at 20 now and generally, the people didn't like it. And I'm not criticizing him or what he did, he had to do what he had to do and he's making his own decisions, I don't know. But there's been -- undoubtedly, there are spots where CEOs are in this thing where they like, they've got legal dollar spend, everything is good, there's ego, there's pride, there's reputation, there's all these things. I did not know with certainty that I could take down the second portion of that portfolio at the same cap rate that I negotiated. I knew we were in a changing environment. And I knew that, hey, it was reasonable for this other party to go out, and then if they could go sell these materially tighter then, yes, maybe I would have been unwound, right, because we could have sold the asset and I would have sold my portion at a tighter cap rate then. But I wasn't doing this as a trade. I was doing this to add true industrial manufacturing portfolio into ours, combine the natural strengths to diversification, and to get us size, because size does matter down the road. But I wasn't going to do that -- I wasn't going to tilt into a hope certificate or windmill and just hope for the best because that's not a strategy with people's dollars. And so I didn't have that certainty. That's why we had looked at the market to see could we go do a little bit of raise to buy certainty. But then that raise, when I -- in that particular situation, was going to be not accretive. And so, okay, why am I doing this? Because I want to be bigger? Because everyone tells us we need to be bigger? No, we need to be smarter. And so that's still a solid portfolio. And they very well may read or listen to these things, and they're great guys, there's no problem about it. They would probably -- well, here's an interesting thing. Depending on what rates do, they will probably sell that higher than what they sold it to -- or what was willing to sell it to us. They had a fund. It was in an institutional fund that was closing. So they had -- they didn't want to wait, for us to sell a couple of assets and roll them over. They wanted us to do it fast. And I just didn't want to take that risk because if I go out and say, okay, I'm going to go sell KIA tomorrow, it might be a really crappy time to sell KIA. And I don't really want to sell KIA right now. But if I had to go put it down to my head and sell KIA just to go and closing another thing to maybe get that thing, that's forcing a decision, that's not smart. And so that's what really came out, is that we had to make a tough decision. We could have closed over it. The first part would have looked accretive. We probably would have rallied in the near term. But I would have taken on sort of existential risk on the backend, and I have to think 2 years ahead. I can't think a quarter. I think 2 or 3 years ahead because I have to do this -- I have to preserve the value of the portfolio while growing it intelligently. And so will that deal come back? I don't know. There were 2 other JVs that we -- very similar size that we've had conversations with. But here is a fundamental problem right now. All these private equity portfolios, which I like, and they're neither better or worse quality than ours. I mean when you're getting manufacturing, there's always a little bit of dirt and rust on your facade, right? There's a patina. But they're good durable assets. But they're all levered portfolios. And all of these portfolios are 20-to-1 vintage portfolios. So if you leverage your portfolio in a PE fashion, let's say, I don't know, maybe it's 60%, maybe it's 70%, if you levered it in 2021 and maybe you took 4 or 5-year paper, you've got to solve for this. You've got to solve for this probably by the end of next year, a lot of these. Some of them may be a little bit longer. If you look in August, you, okay, winds have shifted, rates are going to come down. We're going to start to see clarity. January, February, March, maybe we're going to have a lot of flowing capital again. But we've got a 10-year that's higher than it was before the Fed ever did anything and we don't have a clear path to what that rate is going to be in a year. And there are looming debt maturities coming. And we haven't really seen the CRE doomsday articles recently, and I'm not saying that they're going to happen, and I think some of them were way overblown and they're mischaracterized. But the reality is there is a lot of leverage in the system that does need lower rates, or they just need to sort of a Come to Jesus moment because they're going to have to pony up more equity. And so with these portfolios, they all have highly-levered capital effects. I'm not flush with capital. If we could go -- if the market said, Hey, we'll give you $100 million of capital that's accretive, then I'll go do those deals. But I don't want to bet on some future things and say, hey, I was wrong. The market does not give a [expletive] about us. They do not want to give us this money. And now we're stuck with that portfolio that we can't close in the backend because remember, when at Compass Crest I stepped into that. And it was nasty. It was a nasty thing to see, where you had a half-completed UPREIT transaction and a JV will own 60% of your portfolio, and you had -- you couldn't -- you were in a rock and a hard spot and that's because the decisions made years prior. And so I didn't want to do that. It's a tough decision we made. Will these come back? They could. We don't want to burn bridges. We are the premier manufacturing REIT. The reason why they are having conversations with us, and from the other ones that have been having conversations with us, is we are a form of liquidity. We are a way for their investors to get shares but then make the individual decisions. Because if you're a fund, you're making a singular decision. We are liquidating this fund, and you're all getting your money back, and I do that they like to roll their money into the next fund, or not. As a public company, everyone gets to make an individual decision. So you, Steve, tomorrow, need money to go to Disneyland, you can sell your shares and the guy next to you doesn't have to. And so that's still valuable, that currency is still valuable, and we believe that those opportunities still exist, but we just weren't going to force it now. All right. We talked everyone to death.