It's always a price relative to our independent estimate of intrinsic value. And so if we were to - potentially due to fundamentals revise downward the intrinsic value estimate or if the price were to increase and at this point, that would be a material increase, then we would perhaps start to sell. To sort of reiterate, a few of the things that I discussed, if you go back since we bought it in April of 2013, for the first, I’ll say, a year and a half, so about six quarters, I think there was a view in the market place that the industry, because it had consolidated down to three main players, enterprise, Hertz and Avis that there would be, to some degree, rational competition, including something perhaps similar to the airline business, where there were some outright capacity reductions and I think that to some degree played out and pricing was positive in the low single digits, but positive and the stock price went from slightly below 30 where we initially bought it to as high as the high-60s. And I think along the way, we maybe took $15 million of profits. And then when pricing went negative in part because perhaps the industry wasn't quite so rational in particular, I think a lot of people are pointing to Hertz as being the party that's been most responsible for at times over-inflating [ph] in the industry, but you can't just put everything on one particular company. But as that turned, the price started to come back down and we started by more. I don’t know if you recall, but early in 2016, the price got to the low-20s and I think as a firm, we added more including in the small cap, we added to it to where it was our largest position. Over 2016, perhaps similar to the pattern this year, the year started off pretty rocky and then recovered a little bit in the second and third quarters of 2016 where pricing did increase and the second and third quarters are by far the most important quarters for the company. And taken all of that together, the EBITDA for Avis was relatively flat in the mid-800 millions. And as I said, they bought $390 million of shares, which reduced the share count I think by about 10%. So in my view, the fundamentals in 2016 were relatively flattish, but the intrinsic value probably went up a bit all else equal by the reduction in share count. And so then forward into 2017, clearly what the market is more concerned about and I shared some of that concern as used car prices and to give rough math to it, a 1% increase in rate per day can offset about 2.5% of unit fleet costs. And so if pricing is flat and unit fleet costs are anywhere from two to, let’s say up 3%, that has a negative EBITDA impact in the tens of millions of dollars, perhaps about $50 million. So that would not be a good scenario, but certainly not anywhere near impacting their ability to continue to buy back shares like they've done. And so what could change very meaningful impacts for much lower residual values which directly impact unit fleet costs or the industry not reacting like I'd expect them to react, which is in the face of that to try to hold capacity at least under demand to try to resolve that from time to time over-inflating difficulties in the industry. And so that's sort of the outlook is that if they were able to continue to generate $300 million plus of free cash flow and continue to buy back stock, I think we should be fine. I think back to a couple other scenarios, for instance in 2011 and 2012, some of our biggest holdings were in the financial sector and they were Assurant and Assured Guaranty. And like Avis, they have very large balance sheets, different businesses of course, but large balance sheets, which they try to earn some kind of spread between their assets and their liabilities and both Assurant and Assured Guaranty essentially pursued a strategy of trying to keep the top line as flat as can be and using significant free cash flow to repurchase shares. Both of those companies went on to do very well in terms of their stock price appreciation. Assurant even better than we would have expected in part because they sold one business to Sun Life that wasn't generating a lot of earnings for a pretty significant sum. I think it was almost $1 billion, I think it was at least over 900 million. And so by pursuing such a strategy, you can have a somewhat challenged top line, and yet if your business is such that you're generating a lot of cash flow, there's a lot of levers you can push to still generate attractive share price returns for shareholders. So that’s a long way of saying that we’ll continue to monitor the relationship between the current price and what our estimate of value is, but right now, there's a pretty large gap between the two and we'll see how the year progresses.