Alright, well, thank you, Jeff. And I wish I could paint a better picture than what Jeff is just laid out. But the facts are the situation is pretty grand for the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the U.S. And on Slide 11, if we can advance to that, we'll talk a little bit about that. But we're losing the entire front end of the field cycle. When you look at primary mining, there are really only two companies left that have production around commercial terms. That's us Ur-Energy and Energy Fuels and we're the two co-petitioners. But we both have in-situ facilities that have been able to remain in operations even in these current market condition. Other than that, all of the other facilities are either in the process of shutting down or have reduced production to insignificant levels. Is not just the mining end, also our conversion facility in the U.S. which is located in Metropolis, Illinois, that [indiscernible] facility, it shut down in 2017. That's left the U.S. with no ability to convert material. So we've completely lost that front end of the cycle. They maintain a skeleton staff there. They're hoping to restart. But the fact of the matter is any facility, the longer it sits there idle, the more difficult it is to bring back into production. The next step in the fuel cycle is enrichment. We also lack any domestic uranium enrichments capability in the U.S. And by domestic uranium enrichment, what I mean by that is domestic technology. We certainly have URENCO facility down in New Mexico, but that is using foreign technology. So it can't be used to process uranium for Defense needs. When it comes to defense needs, we have no existing technology built in place to enrich material for Defense needs. So we are relying on our stockpiles of the Department of Energy has characterize those as finite and diminishing. And we've heard from the Department of Defense that they could be in the market as early as 2025 to purchase uranium for Defense needs. Our response has been not so sure you'll have anybody left at that point, so that's why we filed the Section 232. Right now, we're importing about 40% of our uranium from Russia and Russia satellites and more all the time. China is now beginning to target U.S. utilities to sell and enrich product and we believe that they're going to be taking a bigger bite out of that market as we go forward. Some people say well, we can just rely on our allies to supply that material if there's ever a geopolitical event that disrupt supply. We don't believe that that's true. If you look at our allies around the world, and Canada and Australia, they're dramatically cutting back on their production as well, ensure what time they could bring those mines back online. But as I previously stated, the longer those are offline, the more difficult it is and the more costly it is to bring those back online. We're becoming curiously dependent on Russian satellites for nuclear fuel supply. It's only being worsened by China beginning to target the U.S. But we believe that it can be corrected. We can move to Slide 12, please. This chart I think tells us the story quite well. It shows EIA numbers, as well as industry members for the last several years and we also have a projection for 2019. You can see that we're in a steep decline in the primary U.S. mine production. We're going to see additional pressures on that market, as the Russian Suspension Agreement or the RSA ends at the December of 2020. We're already hearing from Russia that they would like to grab a bigger share of the market. They've been quite public on a number of times in their statements in that regard. China also has been tipping their hand that they would like to grab a larger share of the U.S. market. In addition to that, China has been gobbling up supplies around the world in particular in Africa with the Husab mine rising. Langer Heinrich over in Greenland, they've acquired a large rare earth uranium project there. In Nigeria, they've acquired properties there. In Kazakhstan, even in Canada, they've been on a buying spree, gobbling up large deposits around the world. I think though they really kept their hand because a lot of these deposits are not economic. They're extremely low grade even though they're very large tonnage. If they were working in a free market and the market was their concerned, they would not be acquiring these projects and especially would not be putting them into production because their cost of production that these facilities far, far exceeds today's stock market price. So we firmly believe that these acquisitions and these ramp ups by China are simply motivated by geopolitics and not market driven. We also believe the U.S. utilities have been brought into this plan and are engaging in purchases of additional uranium going beyond the Russian Suspension Agreement and trying to fill their books with that material and they're buying into those plans that are being put forward by Russia and China. So when it comes to this - I'm sorry - if we can advance to Slide 13, please. When it comes to the Section 232, if you read the statute, it deals with national security and how the President can alter trade in the interest of national security. In the petition that we filed with Commerce, we laid out three aspects of national security that we think are quite relevant here. The first and probably the most obvious is that we need uranium for our military needs. The uranium that we supply to the Department of Defense for those military needs, it has to be sourced in the U.S. and it has to be processed using U.S. technology. And as I recounted two slides ago, the mining capacity, the conversion capacity, the enrichment capacity, all of that is nearly gone. So we are losing our ability to satisfy our military needs. The second angle on national security is energy security. Our U.S. utilities are becoming increasingly reliant on supplies of material from geopolitical rivals around the world. Countries who certainly don't have our interests at heart it don't share our democratic and free world values. There is nothing to prevent Russia and those countries from cutting off that supply. And in fact, they've indicated that they would be willing to do so as part of counter sanctions against the U.S. If that happens, the free world could be short of uranium very, very quickly. By my calculations, about 88 million pounds a year short on supply worldwide. Finally, the last aspect of national security, which is a little bit more out in the ether, but it is incredibly important, is we're losing our seat at the non-proliferation table. For many decades, the U.S. has been the leader in non-proliferation of nuclear supplies, nuclear weapons around the world. In large that that's because we had the engineers, we have the scientists, we have the production capability in that realm. So that when we sold those to another country, we would put proliferation or obligation on that, so those countries couldn't use it to develop weapons. We are losing that ability. But that vacuum that we're creating by leaving that market is being filled by Russia and China. And Russia and China don't have the same concerns in mind. And I think that's one of the reasons we're beginning to see a proliferation of those materials around the world is because we've lost our seat at the table. We can regain that seat but we've largely lost it. So the remedies that we proposed in the petition that is twofold. First of all, to reserve essentially 25% of the U.S. market by applying a quota on imports that it would essentially set up two markets. One would be a worldwide market where we would continue to get 75% of the material for our utilities. The other remaining 25% would have to be supplied by domestic mines. The second remedy we've proposed is a by American policy where government agencies including the Department of Defense, and also government utilities and other agencies, anytime they buy uranium it would have to be U.S. source. Slide 14 please. So the schedule for the 232 petition, we filed January 16 of 2018, Commerce initiated the investigation by sending a letter to the Department of Defense on July 18, 2018. Since then, they've had a public comment period that ended on September 10, 2018. And they have also sent out questionnaires to both utilities and miners to provide information that will assist with their investigation. Going forward, Commerce must complete its investigation within 270 days and make a recommendation to the President. So you do the math that takes us out to April 14 of this year, so not very far away that Commerce must make their investigation and conclude their investigation. The President then has up to 90 days to either accept Commerce's recommendations or to substitute his own judgment. That 90 days is a maximum, it can actually be shorter than that. But that takes us out to July 15 of this year that a decision will be made by. If you read the Section 232 statute, it lays out that remedies should take place immediately. So any remedies that are taken up by the President and applied, we would expect to see them within a very short term. So with that, Jeff, I'll turn it back over to you.