Yes, it's a great question. And I'll zoom out a level real quick because I think this is kind of a key narrative piece. There's a whole thing about nuclear having been expensive and difficult and those other things for time to build and understand why and where that comes from, the real experience. We've also seen success stories through the things that people like to point to for big plants. But there's another whole vector of attack here, which is what we, I think, as an industry need to think a lot more about, which is how we get back to realizing the true cost potential of nuclear. Look, there's the term I know it's we've used it before. I think it comes out of SpaceX and from Elon Musk, but was the idea of an Idiot Index of what's the ratio of the actual delivered cost of something divided by its actual cost of raw materials. And in nuclear, a lot of times, those are really, really, really high multiples. And a lot of that points to, for a lot of reasons, just kind of how things have been done in the industry, but it's not how they have to be done because, again, nuclear has the fewest material needs per megawatt hour of all energy sources. So there's a lot of room for cost improvement, frankly, just there. And the way I see it and in my experiences, and I think that we've seen at Oklo and what we've tried and designed towards is there's kind of 2 main ways you attack that. One is designing systems that have the passive and inherent safety features that reduce the number of what are called "safety-related or safety grade or nuclear-grade" systems and components. That's one thing, right? And study fast reactors based on what EBR showed, have a good kind of trajectory on hitting those inherent and passive safety features, but then they have a lot fewer things that are required for the safety kind of functions in the plant. The other aspect is how you deliver -- how you actually deliver the parts that need to fall under that kind of oversight or maybe just unique enough because they're only supplied in nuclear, how do you modernize some of that? And there's a whole bunch of opportunity there because in many ways, the nuclear supply chain went out of growth mode by and large, in the '70s and '80s, and it has only now started to come back. But when that happened, we were investing in modernizing the actual processes and procedures and protocols and even just methods of manufacturing and fabrication as well as quality assurance compliance, there wasn't a big impetus to do that. Well, because those changes can be expensive. But we actually have a really big benefit and opportunity to take that and do it differently in a more fresh way today because of how you can work with doing sort of meeting those requirements in a more modern way. If you think about where the world was when those things happened, we were building a lot of Ford Pintos to be candid, right? That was what was going on then you have different level of quality assurance, a different level of expectation at an industrial level. And in fact, I would argue that in many ways, industrial quality assurance has cut up, if not leapfrogged kind of what typical nuclear has been and -- but done so in a much more efficient and effective way. So you can obviously -- and also the pathways by which you achieve the kind of functional outcomes and outputs can be done the same way with like -- with these modern -- I mean, it's not exactly the same, but you can do commercial grade education for these pathways to actually get them to meet what's required in the industry or from the regulatory basis and from a quality control basis. So there's actually a lot of opportunity just from those 2 to drive a total change in cost, which then opens the door for how you think about the suppliers to meet that 30% mix of who fits into this. And yes, some are going to be some legacy, but not large pressurized water reactor. We're not even a small pressurized water reactor, which means we have a very different set of what we can buy and use in the plant. We don't need a pressure vessel because we're not pressurized, right? We can use common alloys of stainless that are used in many other industrial applications that are shown to be compatible in a sodium system. And so you kind of basically partner up and work with different folks, both legacy as well as some newer entrants who want to get into this business and help them kind of meet what's required and do so in a, I would say, a more cost- effective way. So it's kind of an all-in very comprehensive approach on how you attack this problem and do things a bit differently. It's not the best -- it's not always -- it's not the worst always, but it's also not always the best to go to legacy incumbent suppliers because they're used to doing what they've done, trying to get them to modernize can sometimes be challenging. So you find the right ways to work with them, but sometimes it's just better to work with some others. So a big focus has been we have opportunities to partner, obviously, with what's been done. We don't need all the full capacity of what the Koreans can do, but obviously, that means they can definitely do what we need them to do. So there's interesting dynamics there. There's also interesting dynamics about different fabricators [indiscernible]. And we found that some legacy providers and suppliers are really excited about modernizing and they see us as a big pathway to do that because it can help them get experience of doing things in a more modern and efficient way, but then also apply it over the rest of the operations and maybe change their cost curves as well. So like at the end of the day, we see it being pretty attractive to do that and kind of push on that angle of attack. So it's a long-winded answer that's deeply ingrained in Oklo philosophy. And another thing is by building a lot of plants, you can kind of find an approach where maybe you find a couple of different partners for the same system. Maybe not, it just depends, but it gives you that ability to then find the best ways and right ways to partner with folks to be able to buy things from and do so at the right cost or just partner in a way to help them do it with ourselves or us do it, right? So it's a full dynamic about how you attack that problem. But at the end of the day, yes, it's quite helpful that we have, as I like to think about it, the physical cost drivers are generally on our side because we have such a material advantage as the nuclear technology as a whole. And I'll just say like changing that paradigm from a light water reactor, if you're a light water reactor has different complications and challenges. And I would say, in many ways, it can be harder than it is to do it from like an advanced reactor perspective because light water reactors have a pretty specific way of doing things. And if you're going to try to do something differently, given that's the bulk of the plants operating today, there's a lot more inertia that's kind of resistant to that change and/or modernization or even just lack of appetite, a better way to do it than it is if you're a technology that doesn't have that same paradigm and can bridge outside of the sort of incumbent nuclear supply chains effectively. And that's a big feature that sodium fast reactors have -- and in some cases, I think, have a broader envelope of opportunity than kind of any other type of technology because of the material compatibility and the technology kind of the operating temperatures in the history of operation. It's a little hard to do that also with gas reactors, I would contend just because, again, pressurized larger scale volumes, nuclear-grade graphite, all that. It doesn't mean it can't be done. It's just a different attack.