Let me break that down, Steven, into 2 sections. From a growth mindset standpoint, we believe that we have found the bottom and that we intentionally landed the plane quarter after quarter after quarter in the '25 calendar year in the same range of revenue to prove out that we can take the individual KPIs that built the financial statement and saw improvements in those. And whether that's margin, sales and marketing, et cetera, we knew we needed to do that on a consistent basis, not a flash in the pan. And we felt like the revenue being all over the place big highs and big lows wouldn't give us that really uncontaminated view of where we needed to be. Through that process, though, it also uncovered a number of inefficiencies in our business. And where we really have not delivered from an expectation standpoint is around conversion. And any time you look at driving revenue and improving conversion, the one toggle that's inside of there aside from site sales and overly -- being overly promotional, is how much money are you spending to bring people to the party. And over the last couple of years, I think when the company bought the intellectual property out of Bed Bath in 2023 made the great misstep or miscalculation of assuming that the data that it acquired was going to translate into e-commerce revenue. And what we learned is that we needed to spend a considerable amount of time and money augmenting and segmenting the data to really understand who those customers were, where they originally came from, what their propensity was to do business with us and how are we going to reattract them to our business and more importantly, convert them into the second sale. If you go back and you look at the financial statement at the end of '23 and quite frankly, most of '24, we were just adding as many people to the file with no real logic behind the lifetime value calculation inside of them. It became buy a PLA ad, sell a couch, lose a couple of hundred bucks and then not really worry about how we're going to retain them. What's really been instrumental in 2025 is we've started to see retention start to pick up. And while we're not disclosing those numbers just yet until we know that they're pure and not contaminated, we have started to see return buyers come back on it, quite frankly, more repetitive basis than we had originally anticipated. When we look at the target of 12% for 2026, we know there's a multitude of factors. And I'll start with us making sure that the data set that we have both from our omnichannel partner, our different brands, legacy data is clean, pure, de-duped and really in a condition that can be monetized. I think the second thing that we learned is that one size doesn't fits all. And in 2024 and even the first part of '25 it was like a ready, aim, fire. We would just send e-mails out to everybody. There was no personalization. And we've started testing a high level of personalization using the overstock platform first, largely because the risk wasn't as severe if we made a mistake. We're seeing site speed increase, conversion increase, but more importantly, we're seeing consumers who are served up a personalized experience start to convert better, start to engage better and start to return at a better rate. I think additionally, as we think about it, we have work to do in our performance marketing. Our performance marketing over the previous 12 months has been good. It's been good enough for '25. It is not good enough for '26 and whether that's continuing to cleanse the site, continuing to work on different strategies, we know that between adding internal talent and partnering with external talent, we think there is a ton of money left on the table. Could be as much as $10 million of inefficient spend still existing in our business today. I look at inefficient spend as a [low] [Technical Difficulty] margin transaction with a low propensity to return. That's what I consider inefficient. It's not, did we have a positive ROAS of some amount. We have a finite amount of capital. We want to make sure that we're chasing that capital, chasing that customer with a high contribution margin. 6%, 7%, 8% contribution margin with a high AOV and a high likelihood to return again. That's ultimately the stack that we think we need to build. So there is a lot of conviction and there's a lot of work to get there at the same time. But I wanted to put that number out there both for external purposes and to lay the gauntlet down that in our side of business, [Technical Difficulty] is the mandate.