Thank you, Ed. This morning we reported as widely expected normalized FFO of $0.47 per diluted share. There is only one, albeit, large adjustment that I want to point out. We reported a net gain on sale of real estate and other of about $452 million. The gross amount, of gains included approximately $600 million related to our sale of eight Steward facilities to the Macquarie joint venture, but we offset that with the accounting rules required write-off of about $125 million in unbilled straight-line rent. To be abundantly clear, this accounting adjustment has 0 impact on the collection of rent over the term of the lease. And I will take this opportunity to remind our investors and analysts that virtually all of, any, historical adjustment to straight-line rent have been for similar reasons, that is, in relation to highly profitable property sales or in relation to other re-tenanting. And in recent years these re-tenanting transactions have been primarily related to Adeptus and Alecto and by the way have been prominently and expressly described in our public disclosures. In other words, to clarify a misstatement from one recent report, these adjustments to straight-line rent are routine ordinary cores and have nothing to do with lease amendments. So for example, the $2.6 million write-off of straight-line rent shown in this quarter's FFO reconciliation, relates to the profitable sale of one of the former Adeptus hospitals mentioned in this morning's press release. Other adjustments to normalized FFO for the quarter are routine and immaterial individually and in the aggregate although, I'll be happy to address any questions during our Q&A. Our G&A expenses increased slightly due primarily to two seasonal-type reasons. Number one, during each year's first quarter we incur about five times the employer taxes and 401(k) match of the other three quarters. So in 2022's first quarter, this amount was $2.6 million versus the fourth quarter of 2021 of less than $500,000. Second, prior year compensation primarily non-executive bonus accruals are trued up and this typically results in about another $0.5 million incremental expense. There are other minor ins and outs and the only reason I mentioned these very small amounts, is to make clear that this quarter-to-quarter increase is not indicative of any change in our G&A cost structure. This morning we filed on our website a few slides that address some of the misdirection that Ed mentioned earlier. And one of those slides compares MPT's G&A to others in our peer group. I'll mention other of these slides in a few minutes. We noted in this morning's press release, that going forward we have revised our guidance methodology from our historical run rate to a more conventional calendar year estimate. Our scale as a $22 billion company and the resulting level of what is material makes this a more appropriate way to estimate near-term results than when we were much smaller. There are two primary differences. First, we will no longer project the rents to be received upon completion of development and other capital projects. Sometimes these rents are not received until two or more years into the future. So, our previous guidance included approximately $25 million in anticipated rents primarily from our development projects, even though the tenants had not commenced paying rent. That $25 million about $0.04 per share annualized is now no longer included in our new calendar 2022 guidance of between $1.78 and $1.82 per share, with the exception of the recently delivered Ernest's Bakersfield facility. Second our guidance no longer attempt to adjust for the estimated future dilutive impact of capital transactions, because the timing and source of that capital is not definitive. The calendar year 2022 FFO guidance of $1.78 to $1.82 per share includes of course the first quarter result of $0.47 that we reported this morning. It also takes into account our expectations concerning the outcome of Prime's repurchase options, for two of the five prime master leases. That outcome remains undetermined, but the dilutive impact of any likely outcome remains well within the scope of our guidance range. Actual calendar results could increase, based on acquisition activity and continued upward pressure on consumer price indices. While decreases may result from timing and quantum of any joint venture transactions or asset sales, subject to possible reinvestment opportunities. Ed made clear, on last quarter's call, and reiterated a few minutes ago, that MPT is not compelled to maintain its extraordinary last 10-year record of roughly 30% compound accretive growth funded by common stock issuances at unacceptable prices. That's why we have estimated a range of accretive acquisitions in 2022 of between $1 billion and $3 billion. We are confident the investment opportunities are there. But the ultimate volume this year will be related to the amount and timing of our access to attractively priced equity capital. We expect this capital to come from some combination of the following. Selected property sales, such as the profitable hospital sales we announced this morning. Joint venture transactions, similar to our extraordinarily attractive Macquarie-Steward deal we just closed and the 2018 Primonial-Median joint venture. We have no binding agreements to announce this morning, but we are confident based on the strong interest from well-known institutional investors who were interested in the Steward portfolio and from ongoing inquiries and solicitations from multiple investors and their advisers that we will be able to replicate these structures. I'll also remind the group that HCA's pending acquisition of Steward's Utah operations, includes the assumption by HCA of the economics of our current master lease with Steward with respect to those Utah hospitals. And I'll point out two very important considerations. First, this implies a fair value of these facilities significantly higher, than our investment in them. This of course, is testimony to MPT's underwriting and to Steward's strategic and operational expertise. And second, recall, that MPT has a put option that subject to FTC approval and closing of the transaction with Steward, allows us to sell these assets to HCA at fair value. It is currently not our expectation or our plan to exercise that option in the foreseeable future. But when compared with an alternative that would contemplate funding our growth with common stock sales at recent prices, it should make clear to anyone that, it is highly unlikely that there will be any such common issuances. So far our JV strategy has been to assemble a portfolio of well underwritten, but perhaps previously under-managed assets, seizing these assets, while our premier operator tenants improved the financial performance, and then sell an interest to our JV partners. This has been very profitable and very beneficial to our common shareholders. But we also have the ability to co-invest with joint venture partners on the front end of acquisitions and this may be another attractive strategy for capital access in periods such as recently during which these highly sophisticated and experienced joint venture partners place much higher values on our assets than does the public equity market. Finally, we continue to generate meaningful excess AFFO above our dividend payout. And in the inflationary environment that looks like, it may be with us for a while, this free capital is likely to accelerate. To the extent that, we rely on our current portfolio for continued long-term success in growing and collecting our cash rent and in using this portfolio to harvest built-in gains and access additional efficient equity capital, we have enhanced our tenant level reporting of lease coverage. On page 13 of our first quarter supplement, we have listed a significant majority of our major tenant relationships and their most recent trailing 12-month EBITDARM to lease payment coverage ratio. We think it makes abundantly clear that, our operators continue to generate EBITDARM at sector-leading ratios to leased payments, and that the unencumbered assets that may be available for joint venture or other transactions are no less financially attractive to potential partners than where our Macquarie and Primonial portfolios. Before we go to questions, I want to point out again the investor update that, we posted to the MPT website this morning, and just call your attention to a few of the slides. We presented these to correct what may have been misinterpreted based on recent third-party commentary. First, we present a summary of adjusted FFO, over the past 10 years compared to dividends paid. We have always considered and prominently displayed the AFFO metric because we, like many real estate investors think it's critically important to measure results not only based on GAAP, which includes mandated, non-cash straight-line rent, but on a measure that does not include this non-cash unbilled rent concept. As the slide says, cash cannot be engineered or manipulated. I mentioned earlier that, any straight-line rent write-offs have not been related to lease amendments, but primarily highly profitable property sales. We must have cash to pay our dividends, which have grown consistently and this cash comes from tenant operations. And by the way, we maintain a very strong payout ratio most recently in the 80% of AFFO range. To demonstrate, the sustainability of this cash-driven business plan, I already called your attention to our new disclosure in the supplemental that summarizes the coverage strength of our major tenants. But that is not to say that, even with strong local facility performance, operators will never get stressed and MPT will never need to re-tenant its facilities. Thankfully, it has happened over our 18-year history less than a handful of times. And in those rare circumstances, we have in the aggregate actually improved our financial positions. Page 7 in this morning's deck, summarizes how our specialized knowledge about hospital operations, underwriting expertise, and carefully structured master lease arrangements led to a successful, if distracting re-tenanting process in the worst of circumstances. And those circumstances included a complete termination of the existing operator, and a lengthy bankruptcy process. I'll not regurgitate the Adeptus experience as most of you are familiar with it and live through it with us. I'll just point out that we have recently sold the last of the major Adeptus hospitals both at substantial profits resulting in a quantifiable value well in excess of the $415 million investment we had made when Adeptus went into bankruptcy. A recent third-party note made much of the concept that net lease cash yields should "trend up and to the right." And of course as our slide number 8 shows that's exactly how our leases perform, virtually without exception as the chart in the top half of that slide demonstrates. And in the current inflationary environment that many economists believe will be with us for a while. That curve up and to the right will grow even steeper. But the report then implies that, there is something surprising that on a consolidated balance sheet basis MPT's gross yield is declining. I'm not going to walk this group through the evident arithmetic, because it is apparent and frankly we received not a single question about this. But in today's world, we thought we should document why gross yields come down in a compressing rate environment, while investment spreads remain healthy. Slide 9 compares two sources for the calculation of hospital operating results. Ed has already been through this. But the two methods are operators GAAP basis reporting and the collection by Medicare of the full scope of all charges that hospitals use to report to their reimbursement source. Based on GAAP reporting and the results achieved by relying on CMS reports, the comparison is on Slide 9. I'll not repeat that explanation because most analysts on this call have considered this a long time ago and already understand that the CMS numbers are not meant to arrive at true operating margins. And second, just conceptual to interpret the CMS numbers as indicative of true profitability would imply that virtually no hospital in the country is profitable. Slides 10 and 11 are included simply to address the absurd concept, proposed by a recent news article that implied that MPT consciously, deliberately overpays for real estate so seller lessees will have liquidity to pay the subsequent rent. The slide to summarize two things. First, we of course do not overpay. As demonstrated by recent highly profitable sales of these facilities to sophisticated third-party operators and investors. Second, even if one could accept that a company would execute such an overpayment strategy, the slides make clear that such overpayment would have gone to the sellers of the real estate such as the former owners of Steward or IASIS or community or tenant the parties from whom we bought the real estate and to whom was paid the sale proceeds. These parties certainly did not turn around then and pay Steward's rent out of those proceeds. The proceeds were never available to Steward for anything including rent. Slide 12 makes clear that the majority of MPT equity investments is actually $1.5 billion of hospital real estate that is owned in partnership-type vehicles. About $900 million or 60% of this is half of our MEDIAN asset and half of our Steward Massachusetts assets that are in those two joint ventures. We still own the real estate and nothing more by the way no liabilities in those structures and we still manage the real estate. The remainder is similarly owned acute care hospitals in Switzerland, Spain and Italy. The slide following details non-real estate investments. There are only two true RIDEA investments, both of which have been expressly described in detail previously. Springstone which we bought late last year and the international joint venture that bought Columbia and all other non-US opportunities and infrastructure from Steward two years ago. We have two investments in Steward. First, we have a preferred interest of $139 million. This was originally $150 million but has since been reduced by an $11 million distribution last year. While we are not free to disclose expected returns on this interest in anticipation of certain pending transactions, we can reiterate that we are highly satisfied with the likely profitability of this investment. Second, we have loaned about $360 million the initial proceeds of which went directly to Steward's former private equity owners. These proceeds redeemed from those private equity owners approximately 37% interest in Steward. And in addition to earning a current rate of interest on this loan, MPT expects to receive value equivalent to that ownership interest upon certain events. MPT has no funding or other obligations as a result of these investments. The remaining investments on the slides are self-explanatory, although I will reiterate that none of these investments obligate MPT to support hospital operations or liabilities in any way. So with that we'll wrap up our prepared remarks. It's taken a little longer than normal today but we will nonetheless open the call to questions. Operator?