Thanks, Mark. Hey, good morning to everybody in the Americas and good afternoon to all of our friends in Europe. I'm excited to have joined the IP team with our rich history, important mission, and dedicated, talented people. Prior to joining IP, I spent a decade as CEO of IDEX Corporation, where we delivered strong, consistent results through great teams, customer obsession, and embracing an 80/20 operating system. I also spent several years working with private equity, where speed and impact are at a premium. I've been asked many times since my announcement, why IP? The bottom line is that through my deep diligence, very similar to how I approach acquisitions, I found a company that matters in terms of its mission, a company with solid underpinnings, and a company with a lot of opportunity for improvement and significant upside potential. It is absolutely a diamond in the rough. I spent my first 90 days on a learning journey with the goal of getting fact-based insights, aligning the team, dimensionalizing the opportunity, and launching the improvement plan. It's been a powerful experience, an opportunity to speak with employees, customers, suppliers, and investors. All of this has reinforced my initial beliefs and opened new insights. Let's turn to slide five. So before we go through the quarter, I'm going to talk about the case for change International Paper. And later in the presentation, I'm also going to talk about what we're planning to do differently to drive significant change at IP and significantly improve performance. So I'm going to spend a few minutes walking you through some of the data that highlights the challenges we faced as a company in a very candid, fact-based way. The data and feedback have told me that most of our performance issues are self-induced. And as a result, these can be fixed with intense focus on the right strategy and courage to do what must be done. I'm going to start on slide six. You can see 10 years of data here. These are the facts that I know as owners of IP you appreciate. We have underperformed on every meaningful metric. You can see the realities of sales, margin, and profitability decline. And although it's not on this chart, our return on invested capital has followed the same trend and is underwater today. I want you, as our share owners, to know I understand this is totally unacceptable and we are going to fix it. But to fix it, we need to understand the root cause, we must face the brutal facts and do something very different. Let's go to slide seven. IP's performance deterioration has been exacerbated by some very important choices in capital allocation and resource allocation. You can see over the past decade, we've spent more than $35 billion, including returning cash to share owners, making investments, and improving the balance sheet. Let me start with the efforts around the balance sheet. We made excellent choices here, deleveraging and funding our pension. A strong balance sheet is foundational and gives us great degrees of freedom for value creation. But we've also spent more than $12 billion on dividends and share repurchases. Both of these tools can create substantial value if used well, but are value destructive if used poorly. IP will pay an attractive dividend. We can support our dividend at the current level and we will grow into it as performance improves. But as I think about share repurchases, when and how you do it really matters. As with most companies, IP purchased shares when cash was generated, but not in the mind of maximizing the opportunity based on market factors and intrinsic value. The remaining spend, $2 billion on acquisitions and $12 billion on CapEx have not generated the returns we expect. I'm now turning to slide eight. Importantly, our spending since 2018 on investments that drive performance for customers and productivity have lagged. I'm not saying that we can't be more efficient with capital than our competition, but we pushed the envelope too far. While our mills are well capitalized and advantaged, we spent too much on unproductive capacity and haven't stayed ahead of the curve. We have under-invested in our box system. On the right-hand side is where you can see this show up. We've underspent on maintenance and repair, and this is the heartbeat of our operations and what drives reliability for our customers and productivity. These numbers are supported by the conversations I'm having with our folks across our system, particularly in maintenance. We've got an incredibly long list of great opportunities that need capital to drive performance for our customers and expand profitability. When we're driving excellent reliability internally, we get excellent reliability externally, and we will excel for our customers and get paid for value. That means we've got to spend some money. And I believe we can do that with capital playing in the range of $1 billion to $1.1 billion per year. If opportunities exist and drive results, by expanding those investments, we will do so. I'm turning to Slide nine. This is probably the most important slide that we're going to go through here today, that and capital allocation. The lack of investment back into the businesses has directly contributed to a cost problem. Operating costs have ballooned on modest sales growth. The good part here is that it's in our control. We can attack this and control our own destiny. What doesn't show up on this page is the impact of the slippage of reliability for our customers. Reliability, defined as quality, delivery, and service, is the most important factor for the vast majority of our customers. We made our own bed here under investing in cost that has lost its market share over the past decade. The share loss will continue over the near term, but again, we know how to reverse this and control our own destiny. We've done a lot of work commercially to position ourselves correctly in the market. We've made sensible value over volume trade-offs recently, and we're ramping up our commercial talent, capability, and incentives. We have lost other share where we let customers down. We will change this by being the leader in reliability. We've made some solid progress in on-time delivery, and our corrugator and converter capacity is up. But we have more to do to arrest the share slide. I'm now turning to slide 10. I'll talk about this of where to build from and things to improve. IP has a strong culture of ethics. We work with integrity. This is a really hard thing to change within an organization, and we have a great foundation here. We have talented, experienced people up and down the organization. I'm finding them willing to face the reality and embrace significant change. My team wants to win. They are tired of getting their butts kicked. My job is to focus and align them on the critical few and away from the trivial many. The strongest thing we have to build from is our North American Packaging franchise. Our packaging franchise is incredibly valuable and has tremendous upside potential with the right strategy. And as I mentioned earlier, we have a strong financial foundation. Turning to the opportunities for improvement, we are embracing an 80/20 operating system to do four things. First, an outside-in customer-driven strategy that differentiates through reliability and leverages our reach. Second, optimize our cost structure. Third, align our team and resources toward differentiation and profitable growth. Finally, we will instill a high-performance culture that achieves superior results. In a little bit, I'm going to talk about how we are embracing 80/20 to drive results. So now let me turn to the second quarter about performance and the outlook. I'll share some highlights and then turn it over to Tim to walk through the details. I'm now on slide 12. Our second quarter earnings were higher than the first quarter, but relatively unchanged year-over-year. We saw a sequential improvement driven by higher sales across our sales prices across the portfolio, and we got benefit from seasonally higher box volumes. Regarding the market environment, they were stable to moderately better demand. However, IP's packaging volumes came in below our expectations and continued to lag the overall market, and that will continue for some time. We've seen expected volumes decline from repositioning and optimizing value and volume. We do have residual effect from a history of underinvesting in certain regions and markets where we have ongoing reliability and capacity issues that we are addressing and have seen improvement in already. We need to make sure that we are close to the market, pricing appropriately, and investing to be the leader in reliability. As I mentioned earlier, we're focused on investing and differentiation, and we are seeing specific results that are leading indicators to positive change. It will, however, be messy over the next three to four quarters. We expect near-term performance to be challenged by seasonally lower volumes and higher mill outage expense. With that, I'll turn it over to Tim to provide more details about our second quarter performance and our outlook.